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Many rivers to cross: the recognition of LGBTQI asylum in the UK1  




The Refugee Convention was not written with the persecution of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, queer or questioning and intersex (LGBTQI) people in mind. This article shows 
the dilemmas this creates for LGBTQI asylum seekers and their advocates when establishing 
the case for protection. It uses the UK experience as an example and brings the literature on 
this topic up to date with reference to recent cases with implications for LGBTQI applicants. 
While there has been a welcome shift to recognising that LGBTQI persecution is a legitimate 
basis for asylum, contradictions and tensions between UNHCR, European and UK guidelines 
and instruments, as well as between UK policy and practice, have resulted in a lack of 
consistency and fairness in the treatment of LGBTQI asylum seekers. The article identifies 
three specific areas of concern and goes on to show what happens when they converge, 
using a case that exemplifies some of the problems – AR (AP), against a decision of the 
Upper Tribunal (Immigration & Asylum Chamber) [2017] CSIH 52. It concludes by suggesting 
a shift in the focus of questioning from the identity of the asylum seeker to the persecution 
in the country of origin as a possible basis for fairer treatment of LGBTQI asylum claims.  
 
1. Introduction 
It is recognised that the Refugee Convention of 1951 was not created with LGBTQI 
persecution in mind.2 The archetypal refugee is a single young male political activist with no 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to my colleagues at the University of Sussex, Nuno Ferreira, Darcy Leigh and Samantha Velluti 
for their valuable comments on a previous version of this article. 
2 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual Orientation 
and/or Gender Identity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees (2012) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/50348afc2.html> accessed 21 April 
2017; S Jansen and T Spijkerboer (2011) Fleeing Homophobia: Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity in Europe (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 2011) 1. 
defined sexual identity – which is to say implicitly heterosexual.3 However, along with 
growing recognition of LGBTQI rights, there has also been recognition that homophobia and 
transphobia are reasons why people have to flee their home countries. The challenge then 
is to recognise sexual minorities’ narratives of persecution within a system that was 
designed for other kinds of abuse, but which is the best international protection mechanism 
that presently exists. This article considers how this has happened in the UK, where 
guidance and practice in this area has developed on an ad hoc basis and is often clumsy and 
inconsistent. This article identifies the implications of this for individuals fleeing persecution 
on the grounds of their sexual orientation and/or gender identity. It begins by contrasting 
the increasingly positive public discourse on LGBTQI rights with the increasingly negative 
public discourse on asylum and immigration to provide the context for the developments 
discussed subsequently. It goes on to identify three specific areas where LGBTQI claimants 
encounter difficulties: the ‘discretion’ test; contradictions and inconsistencies in the 
application of Country of Origin Information (COI); and finally in relation to membership of a 
‘particular social group’ and credibility more broadly. While these problems have been 
identified and analysed in the literature,4 this article takes a new direction in considering 
                                                          
3 V Neilson, ‘Homosexual or Female? Applying Gender-based Asylum Jurisprudence to Lesbian Asylum 
Claims‘ (2005) 16 Stanford Law & Policy Review, 419-420. 
4 S K Arnold, ‘Nexus with a Convention Ground: The Particular Social Group and Sexual Minority Refugees in 
Ireland and the United Kingdom’ (2012) 1 Irish Law Journal 93; L Berg and J Millbank, ‘Developing a 
jurisprudence of transgender particular social group’ 
(2013) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2312887> accessed 2 February 2017; A 
Briddock, ‘The Recognition of Refugees Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the UK: An 
Overview of Law and Procedure’ (2016) 4(1) Birkbeck Law Review 123; C Costello, ‘Safe Country? Says Who?’ 
(2016) 28 (4) International Journal of Refugee Law 601; J Dawson and P Gerber, ‘Assessing the Refugee Claims 
of LGBTI People: Is the DSSH Model Useful for Determining Claims by Women for Asylum Based on Sexual 
Orientation?’ (2017) International Journal of Refugee Law 292; J L Gartner, ‘(In)credibly Queer: Sexuality-based 
Asylum in the European Union’ (2016) <http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/578-in-credibly-
queer-sexuality-based-asylum-in-the-european-union/print> accessed 7 November 2016; J C Hathaway and J 
Pobjoy, ‘Queer Cases Make Bad Law’ (2012) 44 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 
315; N LaViolette, ‘Independent human rights documentation and sexual minorities: an ongoing challenge for 
the Canadian refugee determination process’ (2009) 13(2–3) The International Journal of Human Rights 437; R 
A Lewis, ‘“Gay? Prove it”: The politics of queer anti-deportation activism’ (2014) 17 (8) Sexualities 958; A 
Macklin, ‘Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories’ (1995) 17(2) Human Rights Quarterly 213; J 
them in relation to the UK government’s published materials on the treatment of LGBTQI 
asylum claims, interrogating these materials for flaws and inconsistencies. It shows how the 
concurrence of these three problems leads to systemic inconsistency and unfairness in the 
treatment of LGBTQI claimants. It concludes by advocating a shift in the focus of questioning 
from the identity of the asylum seeker to the persecution in the country of origin in order to 
create a fairer asylum system. 
 
The article uses the acronym LGBTQI throughout, asking readers to understand it in its 
broadest and most inclusive sense. However, the author acknowledges that the LGBTQI 
acronym conflates many different kinds of identity and identity politics, while at the same 
time excluding others or imposing artificial categories. In relation to asylum there is a 
particular problem in that many case studies labelled LGBTQI focus on gay male asylum 
seekers and the experiences of lesbian, bisexual, trans, and intersex individuals are unheard. 
That problem is reflected in this article, where gay men are the claimants in many of the 
cases discussed. 
 
In UK policy, sexual minority asylum seekers are generally homogenized under the acronym 
LGBTI, conflating what may be very different experiences, identities and grounds for 
claiming protection.5 It may be more difficult for lesbian claimants to convince decision 
makers that they are entitled to international protection, as many of the most concrete 
stereotypes relate to gay men. Indeed, ‘lesbian sexuality is either invisible or it is treated in 
                                                          
Millbank, ‘From discretion to disbelief: Recent trends in refugee determinations on the basis of sexual 
orientation in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 13 (2-3) The International Journal of Human Rights 
391; J Millbank, ‘The Ring of Truth: A Case Study of Credibility Assessment in Particular Social Group Refugee 
Determinations’ (2009) 21(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 1; Neilson (n 3); S Rehaag, ‘Bisexuals need 
not apply: A comparative appraisal of refugee law and policy in Canada, the United States, and Australia’ 
(2009) 13 (2-3) The International Journal of Human Rights 415; J Wessels, ‘HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) – 
Reflections on a new test for sexuality-based asylum claims in Britain’ (2013) 24(4) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 815; J Wessels, ‘Publicly Manifested—Fatefully Determined—Invariably “Discreet”: The 
Assessment of Sexuality-Based Asylum Claims in Germany and France’ (2017) 29(2) Canadian Journal of 
Women and the Law 343. 
5 Home Office, Asylum Policy instruction: Sexual orientation in asylum claims, Version 6.0 (Home Office, 2016), 
36; UNHCR (n 3) 2. 
a manner verging on the pornographic.’6 There is little Country of Origin Information about 
the treatment of lesbians and bisexual women,7 and bisexual asylum seekers have a low 
success rate and are often disbelieved, particularly if they have children, or have been 
married.8  
 
It has been convincingly argued that:  
 
The question of who counts as a ‘genuine lesbian’ becomes apparent most 
dramatically in the asylum process where women have to ‘prove’ that they are 
indeed lesbian if they claim asylum on grounds of sexuality. The country evidence 
that is used by Home Office officials and judges often draws on information that has 
been created for white middle-class gay travellers.9 
 
There is even less information available about transgender asylum seekers and their 
experiences in the UK – and none to be found about intersex claims or the experiences of 
intersex asylum seekers.10 These problems are addressed in part 3.2 below.  
 
2. Recognising LGBTQI asylum in the UK 
                                                          
6 Lewis (n 4). Lewis argues that ‘… heteronormative stereo-types about lesbian sexuality based on the 
assumption that lesbians are naturally more “discreet” about their sexual orientation than gay men become 
the basis for excluding queer female migrants from accessing refugee protection.’ 966. 
7 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, ‘An investigation into the Home Office’s handling 
of asylum claims made on the grounds of sexual orientation March-June 2014’ (the Vine report, 2014), 31.  
8 Lewis (n 4) 965; Rehaag (n 4). 
9 N Held, ‘What does a ‘genuine lesbian’ look like? Intersections of sexuality and ‘race’ in Manchester’s Gay 
Village and in the UK asylum system’ in Francesca Stella, Yvette Taylor, Tracey Reynolds and Antoine Rogers, 
(eds.) Sexuality, citizenship and belonging: Trans National and Intersectional Perspectives (Routledge, London, 
2016), 145. 
10 The APPG Global LGBT Rights report stated that ‘[w]hile many of the issues facing intersex people intersect 
with the concerns addressed in this inquiry, we felt that due to their distinctiveness they require an 
approach that is beyond the scope of the group. We however remain open to investigating the issues facing 
intersex people in the future.’ All Party Parliamentary Group on Global LGBT Rights, The UK’s Stance on 
International Breaches of LGBT Rights” (APPG on Global LGBT Rights, 2016) 13. 
Policy, discourse and public opinion about, on the one hand, gay rights, and on the other 
hand, asylum, have taken different paths in the UK since the end of the 20th Century. While 
formal rights for LGBTQI people have increased alongside support for those rights,11 the 
right to claim asylum and the entitlements of asylum seekers have both been increasingly 
restricted.12 In 2016, the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner expressed 
concern about the effect of negative public rhetoric towards migrants, particularly irregular 
migrants, citing the then Home Secretary Theresa May’s comment in 2012 that the 
Government wished to ‘create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal 
migration’.13 The Commissioner identified ‘a dominant political debate in the UK 
characterised by alarmism’.14 The UK is in 17th place out of the 28 EU Member States in the 
number of asylum applications received and, in 2017, the UNHCR urged the UK to increase 
the number of refugees resettled annually to at least 10,000.15 Floating in-between and not 
fully recognised within either the LGBTQI or the asylum policy agenda, the rights of LGBTQI 
refugees have taken a distinct path – as this article demonstrates.  
 
UK officials and leaders frequently emphasise the country’s proud history of supporting 
refugees and its commitment to continuing to do so.16 In response to the crisis in Syria (but 
                                                          
11 Since the New Labour Government of 1997, legislation has included the Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2003, the Civil Partnership Act 2004, the Gender Recognition Act 2004, and 
the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. 
12 A Burridge and N Gill, ‘Conveyor-Belt Justice: Precarity, Access to Justice, and Uneven Geographies of Legal 
Aid in UK Asylum Appeals’ (2017) 49 Antipode, 23; European Council on Refugees and Exiles and Refugee 
Council, ‘Country Report: United Kingdom. 2016 Update’ (ECRE, 2016). 
13 Interview with Theresa May, The Telegraph, 25 May 2012. 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9291483/Theresa-May-interview-Were-going-to-
give-illegal-migrants-a-really-hostile-reception.html> accessed 8 February 2017. 
14 Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe, Memorandum on the Human Rights of Asylum Seekers 
and Immigrants in the United Kingdom (2016). CommDH(2016)17; Criminal Justice, Borders and Citizenship 
Research Paper No. 2759269: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2759269. 
15 Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe (n 14); UNHCR, ‘UNHCR’s priorities for the UK 
Government’ (UNHCR, 4 May 2017) <http://www.unhcr.org/590b09ca4.html> accessed 12 August 2017. 
16 As Home Secretary, Theresa May said, ‘[w]e have a proud history of relieving the distressed and helping the 
vulnerable – whether it’s through our military, our diplomacy, our humanitarian work or our support for 
in place of participating in a common EU initiative to accept more refugees), the UK 
Government launched the Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme to resettle 
20,000 Syrians by 2020. The programme takes people identified as vulnerable by the 
UNHCR, including persons at risk due to their sexual orientation or gender identity (although 
figures for the number of LGBTQI people accepted on the scheme are unavailable).17 
However, this initiative needs to be seen in the context of wider policy and the conflation of 
asylum and immigration to represent an on-going threat to UK border and population 
control.18  
 
The precise degree to which this affects people fleeing homophobia and, in particular, 
transphobia, is unknown. As of 2011, staff were instructed to flag claims based on sexual 
orientation (though not gender identity) on the Home Office database, but the Vine report 
in 2014 found a ‘woefully poor level of compliance’ in this regard, with only 36% of the 116 
sexual orientation asylum cases identified by John Vine, the Chief Inspector of Borders and 
Immigration, flagged as such.19 The Home Office first published ‘experimental’ statistics for 
                                                          
refugees, let us continue this tradition. Let Britain stand up for the displaced, the persecuted and the 
oppressed. For the people who need our help and protection the most, let Britain be a beacon of hope.’ 
(Speech to Conservative Party Conference, 6 October 2015). As Prime Minister she has said ‘Britain will 
continue to meet our promises to the poorest in the world, including through humanitarian efforts to support 
refugees, …’ Oral statement to Parliament, 7 September 2016, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/g20-summit-pm-commons-statement-7-september-2016> 
accessed 23 July 2017. Home Office guidance on ‘Refugee Leave’ published in March 2017 states ‘[t]he UK has 
a proud record of providing protection for those who genuinely need it, in accordance with our obligations 
under the Refugee Convention’: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/mar/uk-home-office-refugee-
settlement-limits-policy-3-17.pdf> accessed 23 July 2017.    
17 LGBTQI people do not automatically qualify as vulnerable. 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/472020/Syrian_Resettlement_Fact
_Sheet_gov_uk.pdf> accessed 23 July 2017.    
18 UK legislation includes the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
2002, and the Immigration Acts 2014 and 2016. The details of asylum policy are contained in section 11 of the 
Immigration Rules <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules> accessed 23 July 2017; C. Gabrielatos 
and P Baker, ‘Fleeing, Sneaking, Flooding. A Corpus Analysis of Discursive Constructions of Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers in the UK Press, 1996-2005’, (2008) 36, 1 Journal of English Linguistics 5-38. 
19 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (2014) (n 7), 43. 
asylum claims based on sexual orientation in November 2017, after pressure to do so dating 
back to at least 200920 and repeated questions in parliament.21 However, the data relates 
only to sexual orientation and not gender identity. It does not show whether sexual 
orientation was the sole basis of an application, nor does it indicate whether sexual 
orientation had any bearing on the final determination.  
 
Nevertheless, the figures, which cover the period 1 July 2015 to 31 March 2017, show not 
only the countries with the highest number of applications where sexual orientation was 
raised as a factor – namely Pakistan, Nigeria and Bangladesh – but also disaggregate the 
number of appeals with a sexual orientation element that were allowed and dismissed by 
country. The figures show that most appeals by Ugandan and Iranian LGB applicants were 
allowed. Sexual orientation was raised as a basis of 6% of claims made during the period 
covered – very different from the figure of 1.4% suggested by the Home Office on the basis 
of cases flagged on the database cited in the Vine report in 2014.22 Despite their 
weaknesses, the ‘experimental’ statistics for the first time provide legal practitioners, 
advisors and academics with a baseline for assessing discrepancies in decision making in 
cases involving lesbian, gay and bisexual applicants. 
 
 
3. Decision making in LGBTQI asylum claims 
                                                          
20 ‘The Home office should collate and publish data on the number, chosen gender, age and country of origin 
of those claiming asylum on the basis of sexuality or gender identity’ (M Bell and C Hansen, ‘Over not Out. The 
housing and homelessness issues specific to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender asylum seekers’, 
Metropolitan Support Trust, 2009, 64).  
21 Home Office, ‘Asylum claims on the basis of sexual orientation. Experimental statistics’ (November 2017), 
Home Office; UKLGIG, ‘Submission to Women and Equalities Committee Inquiry into Trans Equality: Needs and 
Experiences of Trans Asylum Seekers’ (2015) 4; Asylum: LGBT People: Written question - HL1439, 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-
question/Lords/2017-09-07/HL1439/; questions by Lord Scriven on 2 December 2015 HL4122, Lord Storey on 6 
June 2016 HL433, Lord Scriven on 17 November 2016 HL3335, Lord Scriven on 30 March 2017 HL6482, Lord 
Scriven on 7 September 2017 HL1439. 
22 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (2014) (n 7) 43. 
In the context of the above setting, this article now identifies three problematic aspects of 
LGBTQI asylum decision making in the UK, relating to ‘discretion’, country of origin 
information and credibility It is argued that these three aspects may result in decisions that 
are inconsistent and unfair. 
 
3.1 ‘Discretion’ 
The story of LGBTQI asylum recognition in the UK is to a large extent the story of Home 
Office and judicial interpretation of ‘discretion’ – a term that has taken on a life of its own 
and distinct meaning in this context.  
 
Before 1999, LGBTQI applicants had difficulty meeting the criteria for Refugee Status 
following a High Court ruling stating that they did not constitute a particular social group 
because their only common characteristic of sexual orientation was normally concealed.23 
LGBTQI applicants are now generally recognised as a particular social group as a result of 
the House of Lords judgment in the case of Shah and Islam where it was found that women 
in Pakistan constituted a particular social group.24 The same approach is applied by the UK 
government to gender identity and sexual orientation.25 This is corroborated by the EU 
asylum Qualification Directive affirmation that ‘…depending on the circumstances of the 
country of origin, a particular social group might include a group based on a common 
characteristic of sexual orientation’.26 
 
In the period between 1999 and 2010, having been recognised as a particular social group, 
LGBTQI asylum seekers were likely to be refused not only on grounds of credibility, but also 
or in the first instance because they could return to their country of origin and live 
‘discreetly’. This was known as the ‘reasonably tolerable’ requirement, according to which 
the key question was whether the individual ‘had adapted and would again adapt his 
                                                          
23 R v SSHD ex parte Binbasi [1989] Imm AR 595 (QBD). 
24 Shah and Islam [1999] UKHL 20. 
25 UK Visas and Immigration, ‘Guidance. Transgender identity issues in asylum claims’ (UKVI, 2011), 11; The 
Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006, 6 (e). 
26 Directive 2004/83/EC (Qualification Directive), art 10(1)(d). 
behaviour so as to avoid persecution in circumstances wherein it amounted to his preferred 
way of dealing with the problem and a way which was reasonably tolerable to him’.27 
 
This thinking led to tautologies such as the 2005 case of an Algerian gay asylum seeker 
where it was stated that ‘because in Algeria there are no gay rights, there are no 
opportunities for displaying homosexuality with those who are of a similar mind, and it will 
be impossible for him not to be discreet’.28 Circular thinking appears in another case: 
 
It is the respondent’s position that self-restraint due to fear will be persecution only 
if it is such that a homosexual person cannot reasonably be expected to tolerate 
such self-restraint. Where a person does in fact live discreetly to avoid coming to the 
attention of the authorities he is reasonably tolerating the position.29 
 
Here, living a life of secrecy is taken as evidence that it is tolerable to do so.  
 
In 2010, the UK Supreme Court rejected this kind of argument.30 In the case of HJ (Iran) it 
was for the first time recognised that 'to require an applicant to engage in self-denial was to 
require him to live in a state of self- induced oppression.’31 Sexual identity was accepted as 
being 'a fundamental characteristic and an integral part of human freedom’.32 The effect of 
this significant attitudinal step forward was, however, undermined because ‘discretion’ 
thinking was reformulated in a new test asking: Is the applicant gay or likely to be perceived 
as gay? If so, are openly gay individuals persecuted in the individual’s country of origin? If 
they are, what would the individual do if returned? If s/he would live openly and be exposed 
to persecution, then there is a well-founded fear of persecution even if the risk could be 
                                                          
27 J v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1238; para 13; Wessels (2013) (n 4) 822. 
28 B v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 2528, para 20 (although the case was 
remitted for redetermination). 
29 HJ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKAIT 00044 (18 April 2008), para 10. 
30 HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. 
31 Ibid para 32. 
32 Ibid para 33. 
avoided through ‘discretion’. However, if the individual would live ‘discreetly’, the next 
question is why: 
 
If the tribunal concludes that the applicant would choose to live discreetly simply 
because that was how he himself would wish to live, or because of social pressures, 
e g, not wanting to distress his parents or embarrass his friends, then his application 
should be rejected. Social pressures of that kind do not amount to persecution and 
the Convention does not offer protection against them…  
 
If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that a material reason for the applicant 
living discreetly on his return would be a fear of the persecution, which would follow 
if he were to live openly as a gay man, then, other things being equal, his application 
should be accepted….33 
 
Even at the time, this tortuous test was criticised as both unreasonable and unworkable, 
with the Equality and Human Rights Commission, intervening in the case, pointing out that 
someone who has claimed asylum on the grounds of sexual orientation has effectively 
‘outed’ themselves, precluding the option of returning to live ‘discreetly’.34 Moreover, in the 
years immediately following the 2010 ruling, ‘discretion’ thinking was rejected in UNHCR 
and EU guidance and judgments. The UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No 1, 
published in 2012, state: 
 
The question is not, could the applicant, by being discreet, live in that country 
without attracting adverse consequences. It is important to note that even if 
applicants may so far have managed to avoid harm through concealment, their 
circumstances may change over time and secrecy may not be an option for the 
entirety of their lifetime. The risk of discovery may also not necessarily be confined 
                                                          
33 Ibid para 82.  
34 Ibid para 60, 37. See also R Goodman, ‘Asylum and the concealment of sexual orientation: where not to 
draw the line’, (2012) 44 New York University Journal of International Law & Politics, 422. 
to their own conduct. There is almost always the possibility of discovery against the 
person’s will, for example, by accident, rumours or growing suspicion.35 
 
A year later, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) X, Y and Z ruling found not 
only that ‘… an applicant for asylum cannot be expected to conceal his homosexuality in his 
country of origin in order to avoid persecution’36 but also:  
 
As regards the restraint that a person should exercise, in the system provided for by 
the Directive, when assessing whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted, the competent authorities are required to ascertain whether or not the 
circumstances established constitute such a threat that the person concerned may 
reasonably fear, in the light of his individual situation, that he will in fact be subject 
to acts of persecution.37 
 
At no point does the CJEU advocate the HJ (Iran) approach in which the decision maker is 
required to imagine how a claimant would behave. Rather, the only question is whether 
someone might reasonably fear persecution – something that is certainly the case in a 
country where homosexuality is criminalised.  
 
Following the CJEU X, Y, and Z judgment, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) 
argued that the ‘ultimate question is whether the individuals concerned would face a real 
risk of persecution if they chose to live openly on return’ and decision makers should not go 
beyond this issue. The ICJ pointed out that in X, Y and Z, which post-dated the Supreme 
                                                          
35 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution within the Context of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention And/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(HCR/GIP/02/01)’ (2002), para 32, 9. See also O.S. v. Switzerland Application no. 43987/16 – Written 
Submissions on behalf of the Aire Centre (Advice on Individual Rights in Europe), the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), ILGA-Europe (the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Trans and Intersex Association) and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 2017. 
36 Joined Cases C-199/12, C-200/12 and C-201/12, X, Y and Z v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 7 
November 2013, para 71. 
37 Ibid, para 72. 
Court decision, there is no suggestion that adjudicators should ask the questions posed in 
the Supreme Court ruling.38 
 
Some scholars have also criticised the judgment in HJ (Iran), and from opposing quarters: 
Hathaway and Pobjoy view the decision, and the earlier Australian ruling that informed it,39 
as excessively liberal: 
 
Clearly, going to concerts, drinking cocktails, or engaging in “boy talk” with female 
friends should not attract persecution. But it does not necessarily follow that a grant 
of asylum is owed where risk follows only from a relatively trivial activity that could 
be avoided without significant human rights cost.40  
 
While applauding the rejection of a ‘discretion’ requirement, they argue that in both these 
cases, the courts misapplied the Refugee Convention to protect ‘a boundless range of 
activities’ in relation to claims based on sexual orientation, thus creating a schism with 
claims based on other grounds such as religion or political opinion.41 
 
In contrast, Wessels finds the court’s decision flawed for different reasons: if openly gay 
people are persecuted in a country, then it is difficult to imagine that concealment would 
not be related to that fact and therefore, in her view, the test posited by the Supreme Court 
‘risks coming down to a backward return to “discretion”’.42 
 
Despite international rulings and guidance, and international doctrinal debate, following the 
2010 Supreme Court decision, the UK authorities have consistently adhered to ‘discretion’ 
thinking in all official statements and written guidance. After the ruling, the Home Secretary 
said that with immediate effect ‘… asylum decisions will be considered under the new rules 
                                                          
38 International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), ‘Refugee Status Claims Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity - A Practitioners’ Guide’ (ICJ, 2016) 95. 
39 Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (S395) (2003) 216 CLR 473.  
40 Hathaway and Pobjoy (n 4) 335. 
41 ibid 384. 
42 Wessels (2013) (n 4) p838. 
and the judgment gives an immediate legal basis for us to reframe our guidance for 
assessing claims based on sexuality, taking into account relevant country guidance and the 
merits of each individual case’.43  
 
As an example of the application of this reasoning, a decision letter from the Home Office 
regarding the case of a woman from Malawi sent shortly after the new test was introduced 
by the Supreme Court decision, said: 
 
I am satisfied the appellant is at least bisexual… The country evidence shows Malawi 
to be a dangerous country for practising homosexuals. What would she do if 
removed there? Homosexuality is not a crime in the United Kingdom and there is no 
bar to anybody who is gay to be open about their sexual orientation. The appellant 
has chosen to hide it. That is her prerogative, her free choice. If she can hide it in the 
United Kingdom, where tolerance rules (very effectively it would seem), then she can 
hide it in Malawi.44 
 
The irrationalities of ‘discretion’ thinking in case law are mirrored in government policy and 
Home Office guidance for caseworkers. The ‘discretion’ test is enshrined in the Asylum 
Policy Instruction on ‘Sexual orientation issues in the asylum claim’ updated in 2016. The 
‘discretion’ reasoning is replicated in most Home Office country guidance, including 
guidance on Afghanistan, published in February 2017, which states: 
 
If it is found that the person will in fact conceal aspects of his or her sexual 
orientation/identity if returned, decision makers must consider why the person will 
do so. If this will simply be in response to social pressures or for cultural or religious 
                                                          
43 Home Office, ‘Sexuality judgement welcomed’ (7 July 2010) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sexuality-judgement-welcomed> accessed 23 July 2017. 
44 Refusal letter quoted in UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration Group (UKLGIG), ‘Missing the Mark. Decision 
Making on Lesbian, Gay (Bisexual, Trans and Intersex) Asylum Claims’ (UKLGIG, 2013) 24. 
reasons of their own choosing and not because of a fear of persecution, then they 
may not have a well-founded fear of persecution.45 
 
And in response to a parliamentary question on 15 March 2017, Home Office Minister 
Baroness Williams of Trafford said: 
 
Our guidance fully complies with the Supreme Court judgement in HJ (Iran) which 
held that a person should not be required to ‘modify their beliefs’ or ‘act discretely’ 
in order to avoid persecution; if, on the other hand, they choose to do so for other – 
for example, private – reasons, then they may not be a refugee.46 
 
In 2017, this interpretation of HJ (Iran) was confirmed by the judgment in the case of LC 
(Albania),47 a judgment that was troubling in two ways. Firstly, the government 
acknowledged that it had been wrongly applying a previous case that had been set aside as 
the basis for refusing Albanian asylum claims between 2011 and 2016, meaning that an 
unknown number of Albanian people had been wrongly refused – and in some cases 
returned – on the basis that only those Albanians who go to a particular ‘gay cruising’ park 
in Tirana are at risk of persecution.48  
 
Secondly, the judge rejected the applicant’s argument that, to be consistent with European 
Union law, only the first two questions from the ‘discretion’ test should apply. The applicant 
had argued that decision makers should stop at asking 1) Is the applicant gay or likely to be 
perceived as gay; and 2) If so, are openly gay individuals persecuted in the individual’s 
country of origin? This assertion was rejected and Justice Hinkinbottom stated that the legal 
analysis in the HJ (Iran) was fully in line with European Union law, and that the Supreme 
Court distinction between concealment for fear of persecution and concealment for other 
                                                          
45 Home Office, ‘Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Sexual orientation and gender identity’ 
(Home Office, 2017). 
46 Asylum: Afghanistan: Written question - HL5742 <http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-
questions-answers-statements/written-question/Lords/2017-03-01/HL5742/> accessed 23 July 2017. 
47 LC (Albania) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor [2017] EWCA Civ 351. 
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reasons is ‘principled and clearly right’.49 The judge emphasised the clear distinction 
between concealment ‘in response to social pressures or for cultural or religious reasons of 
his own choosing’, stating that the distinction must be right because ‘such social pressures 
are present in all countries, including the United Kingdom’.50 This could be read as an 
attempt to affirm a clear line between persecution in refugee-producing countries and 
lesser discrimination in refugee-receiving countries – such as the UK. 
 
The case illustrates the difficulty facing decision makers, representatives and judges 
interpreting the ‘discretion’ test. The test states that if fear of persecution is a ‘material’ 
reason for an applicant living discreetly on their return, then their application should be 
accepted. However, it also says that if living discreetly is ‘simply’ because of social pressures 
then it should be rejected. A narrow reading of this wording assumes that individuals have 
single motives for their behaviour. They will conceal their sexuality either because they fear 
persecution or because they are responding to social pressures. Yet, in a country where 
sexual minorities are persecuted, it is more likely that the two motives will co-exist in the 
individual psyche. This is consistent with the requirement that fear of persecution merely be 
a ‘material’ reason for ‘discretion’. Applying this approach, it becomes clear that ‘simply’ 
should be understood to mean ‘only’ in the relevant paragraph repeated here:  
 
If the tribunal concludes that the applicant would choose to live discreetly simply 
because that was how he himself would wish to live, or because of social pressures, 
e g, not wanting to distress his parents or embarrass his friends, then his application 
should be rejected. … If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that a material 
reason for the applicant living discreetly on his return would be a fear of the 
persecution which would follow if he were to live openly as a gay man, then, other 
things being equal, his application should be accepted. Such a person has a well-
founded fear of persecution [emphasis added].51  
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On this reading, it is therefore clear that an individual can only be returned if fear of 
persecution is not one of the reasons why they would conceal their sexual orientation. It is 
difficult to imagine any circumstances where this would be the case for an individual coming 
from a country where homosexuals (the language of the court at the time) are persecuted 
and who has chosen to claim asylum on that basis. One must then consider that this is a 
hypothetical situation, based on an official imagining how someone with very different life 
experiences from his or her own would behave in an imaginary situation, and a judge’s 
subsequent interpretation of that imagining. From this perspective, the entire process 
appears so subjective that using it as the basis for making a decision as critical as the 
granting of refugee status is difficult to justify.  
 
The above discussion shows how with the evolution of ‘discretion’ thinking, critical asylum 
decisions now turn on the subtlest of interpretations of a single word. Described as a 
‘euphemistic misnomer’ by international legal and NGO experts on LGBTQI asylum,52 the 
term ‘discretion’ is indicative of the confusion about LGBTQI identity in the context of 
asylum. This is discussed further in part 3.3 below.  
  
3.2 Country of origin information (COI) 
While the ‘discretion’ debate is important it is only one part of a larger picture. Equally 
critical for advocates and NGOs are the failings in country of origin information (COI).53 All 
asylum applications should be assessed individually on their merits.54 However, it is clear 
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53 Costello (n 4), 614; R Thomas, ‘Consistency in Asylum Adjudication: Country Guidance and the Asylum 
Process in the United Kingdom’ (2008) 20(4) International Journal of Refugee Law, 523; Asylum Aid, Inspection 
of Asylum Casework of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, Asylum Aid response – 
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54 Home Office (n 5) 35. 
from the Home Office statistics that LGBTQI asylum claims from some countries are more 
likely to be refused.55  
 
To aid UK caseworkers in their decisions, there is a Country Policy and Information Team 
which produces Country Policy and Information Notes – CPINs. There are criticisms of the 
structure of CPINs, which combine material labelled ‘policy’ with factual country 
information with the likely result that decision makers under pressure of time will be 
directed towards a ‘predetermined outcome’.56 There are CPINs specifically on sexual 
orientation and gender identity-based claims for a number of countries of LGBTQI 
persecution, but not all. In addition to the gaps in countries covered, there have been 
concerns that the information is often out of date and sometimes internally inconsistent.57 
Decision makers have also been found to use the experiences of LGBTI foreign tourists 
inappropriately to determine whether a country persecutes its LGBTI nationals.58 Moreover, 
much of the guidance confirms the approach to ‘discretion’ discussed above.59  
 
There is little correlation between countries where homosexuality is criminalised, countries 
on the Home Office list of ‘safe’ countries, 60 and the Home Office’s published country 
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56 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (2018) (n53) 3. 
57 Asylum Aid, ‘Inspection of Asylum Casework of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration 
Asylum Aid response – 8th June 2017’. A report by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and 
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58 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (2018) 57. 
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Office, 2017), 9, 3.1.2. 
60 Claims of applicants from designated ‘safe’ countries where it is judged that there is ‘no serious risk of 
persecution’ will automatically be designated ‘clearly unfounded’ – meaning there is no right of appeal from 
within the UK – unless the caseworker finds reasons to designate the application otherwise (Home Office, 
‘Certification of protection and human rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and 
information and guidance. For example, despite the Government raising concerns about 
human rights and violence against LGBTQI people with the Bangladeshi High Commissioner 
in 2016 following the murder of a gay journalist,61 the updated Home Office guidance for 
Bangladesh, published in September 2017, states: 
 
Evidence of violence by non-state actors against LGBTQI people is limited, with 
harassment and discrimination more likely experiences. In general the treatment of 
LGBTQI persons in Bangladesh does not amount to serious harm or persecution, 
even when taken cumulatively. Each case must however be considered on its facts.62 
 
Even within a single document there are inconsistencies. In one of the most recent country 
policy and information notes on sexual orientation on Afghanistan, statements by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in the annex depict Afghanistan as a country 
where homosexuality is ‘wholly taboo’ and where there is ‘very little space… in any location, 
to be an individual that openly identifies as LGB&T’.63 Despite this, the revised Home Office 
guidance, dated only four days after the FCO correspondence, claims that ‘in the absence of 
other risk factors, it may be a safe and viable option for a gay man to relocate to Kabul, 
though individual factors will have to be taken into account’.64 The FCO letter also expresses 
deep concerns at the implication that sexual abuse of boys implied acceptance of some 
homosexual conduct. Yet the main body of the guidance refers to evidence that ‘many 
Afghan men may have had some homosexual experience without having a homosexual 
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asia-36128729> accessed 23 July 2017; HC debate 24 May 2016 Vol 611, Col 382 
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62 Home Office, ‘Country Policy and Information Note Bangladesh: Sexual orientation and gender identity 
Version 2.0’ (2017), 10, 3.1.12.  
63 Home Office, ‘Country Policy and Information Note on Afghanistan: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ 
(Home Office January 2017), 22. 
64 Ibid 9. 
preference. A careful assessment of the credibility of a claim to be a practising homosexual 
is particularly important’.65 The ‘homosexual experience’ referred to here is evidently 
‘bacha bazi – sexual relationships between men in power and adolescent boys’, which is 
mentioned earlier in the guidance.66 This suggests that an asylum seeker claiming to be gay 
may in fact be the victim of child sexual abuse. The guidance does not make this explicit, or 
say that, in such a situation, the boy or man might still be eligible for protection on different 
asylum or humanitarian grounds. It exemplifies the problems identified by the Chief 
Inspector of Borders and Immigration in conflating ‘policy’ with country information.67  
 
There are also contradictions between Home Office instructions and widely reported 
events. South Africa is on the list of countries from which claims are presumed to be 
unfounded despite reports of lesbian women undergoing ‘corrective rape’.68 There are also 
internal contradictions between different Home Office publications: claims by Gambian men 
are presumed to be unfounded according to one document,69 yet more recent country-
specific guidance states: 
 
Where a claim is based on a person’s sexual orientation or gender identify [sic], it is 
not likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.70  
 
This is presumably because – as the guidance states – ‘consensual same-sex sexual activity is 
illegal in the Gambia and carries a sentence of between 5 and 14 years in prison’; a new 
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lesbians’, The Independent, 4 January 2014. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/crisis-in-
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offence of ‘aggravated homosexuality’ punishable by life imprisonment was created in 
2014;71 inflammatory homophobic government rhetoric is frequently reported; and internal 
relocation is not a reasonable option.72 
 
Picking up the earlier question of ‘discretion’, the guidance on Iran shows the illogical 
thinking in relation to internal relocation. It points out that ‘[t]he Islamic Penal Code (IPC) 
criminalizes same-sex sexual relations. Punishments range from lashes to the death 
penalty’.73 Yet individuals are said to be able to relocate and move freely if they do not 
reveal their sexual orientation and keep a low profile.74 The response of most individuals 
will be that any rational person would fear persecution in a country where open expression 
of their identity is a capital crime. Whether or not they would choose to be discreet for any 
number of other reasons is a separate issue to the question of a well-founded fear of 
persecution. 
 
Similarly, the guidance for Jamaica – until recently on the list of ‘safe’ countries despite a UK 
Court of Appeal ruling in 2015 that Jamaica could not be considered a ‘safe country’75 –
notes that Jamaica’s Offences Against the Person Act of 1864 states: ‘Whosoever shall be 
convicted of the abominable crime of buggery [anal intercourse] committed either with 
mankind or with any animal, shall be liable to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour for a 
term not exceeding ten years.’76 The guidance goes on to recognise that lesbians risk 
violence ‘up to and including “corrective” rape and murder’ with insufficient State 
protection.77 Despite this, it quotes a Tribunal ruling saying ‘Not all lesbians are at risk. 
Those who are naturally discreet, have children and/or are willing to present a heterosexual 
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narrative for family or societal reasons may live as discreet lesbians without persecutory 
risk, provided that they are not doing so out of fear’.78 Again, the obvious question is 
whether anyone at risk of corrective rape or murder would not hide their sexuality through 
fear.79 
 
With the publication of the first statistics on sexual orientation-grounded asylum claims, it 
became possible to see that there were successful applications and in many cases a 
significant number of successful appeals made by individuals from all of the countries 
discussed in this part – Bangladesh, Afghanistan, South Africa, Gambia, Iran and Jamaica.80 
While this is by no means an exhaustive list of countries where LGBTQI individuals face 
persecution, it is nevertheless sufficient indication that accurate and up-to-date country 
information is imperative for fair and consistent decision making.  
 
Furthermore, the discussion here shows how ‘discretion’ thinking overlaps with inaccurate 
or out-of-date country information to compound the risk of people being returned to 
situations where they are in danger or their safety is contingent on NGO protection. India, 
for example, is on the ‘safe’ list and Home Office guidance states that ‘India has a large, 
robust and accessible LGBTI activist and support network, mainly to be found in the large 
cities, from which a person can seek support and assistance.’81 Yet, as the International 
Commission of Jurists points out, ‘[t]his approach is legally unsustainable. The responsibility 
to provide effective protection and ensure access to rights without discrimination rests on 
the relevant State and not on NGOs or ad hoc group of individuals who may themselves be 
under threat.’82  
 
Lastly, picking up a point made in the introduction to this article, country of origin 
information may be inadequate in different ways for different sexual minorities. Relocation 
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is likely to be more difficult for lesbians and women in general and this is recognised in 
Home Office guidance.83 At the same time, Home Office staff themselves have complained 
that Country of Origin Information fails to provide ‘comprehensive coverage of sexual 
orientation issues and, in particular, issues relating to the treatment of lesbians and bisexual 
women.’84 Research has identified country guidance cases relating to sexual minority 
women as a priority.85 As previously stated, there is no evidence about intersex people’s 
experiences, and a particular lack of country of origin information in relation to transgender 
persecution with the danger that absence of evidence is taken as absence of persecution.86 
Transgender asylum seekers may find it expedient to make a claim on the basis of sexual 
orientation, serving to disguise the level and nature of transgender persecution and creating 
a vicious circle in which evidence of transgender persecution continues to be non-existent 
and trans experiences are erased.87 This is likely to continue until there is a better 
understanding of the diversity within LGBTQI claims and also of the intersectional nature of 
identity, both of which are critical to the development of an asylum system that is 
responsive to applicants’ experiences, rather than one that imposes a single (gay, male) 
model of sexual minority identity based on Western stereotypes.88  
 
This part has identified four ways in which country of origin information is problematic: 
there are contradictions between different official documents; in at least one case there are 
contradictions within a single official document; country guidance is structurally flawed and 
sometimes out of date or at odds with widely reported facts; and guidance has been 
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identified as inadequate for different sexual minority applicants – specifically lesbian 
women and transgender people. As part of the process of asylum policy harmonization, the 
EU is developing a common ‘safe’ countries list in an initiative that will include a responsive 
approach to any ‘sudden deterioration of the situation in a country designated as a safe 
country of origin’.89 It is difficult to know whether this harmonized approach will lead to 
better decisions. However, given the UK’s impending withdrawal from the EU and the fact 
that it has already opted out of the recast Qualification Directive, it seems unlikely that the 
UK Government will choose to be part of this initiative.90 This means that one potential 
lever for greater consistency, if not greater fairness, is unlikely to be introduced in the UK, 
and evidence and lobbying by lawyers and NGOs will remain critical to improving country of 
origin information.91 
 
3.3. The burden of proof: membership of a ‘particular social group’ and credibility 
Credibility is the ultimate hurdle for all asylum seekers.92 But where most applicants have 
the single challenge of proving they are at risk of persecution, LGBTQI claimants also have to 
prove their sexuality or gender identity in a legal structure that is based on fixed categories 
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and has only recently begun to recognise LGBTQI identities in a positive way.93 As with 
‘discretion’, this is often presented in the form of a test. In this case, the test applied in UK 
law is proving membership of a particular social group. As with the ‘discretion’ test, there 
are inconsistencies between UNHCR, EU and domestic guidance that make it difficult for 
claimants to meet the test’s requirements. 
 
Recognition as a member of a particular social group is the default basis for most LGBTQI 
asylum claims, rather than via any of the other Convention grounds of race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion.94 Membership has two dimensions – an internal and external 
one but it is unclear whether these are alternative or cumulative requirements.95 According 
to the UNHCR, a particular social group is ‘a group of persons who share a common 
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted [internal or fundamental 
characteristic test], or who are perceived as a group by society [external or social perception 
test]’.96 Only one of the two is required, meaning that, in theory, an individual persecuted 
because she was rightly or wrongly labelled as a lesbian would be entitled to asylum without 
needing to verify her sexual identity.  
 
However, the Qualification Directive 2004 substitutes ‘or’ with ‘and’: 
 
a group shall be considered to form a particular social group where in particular: 
members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a common background that 
cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to 
                                                          
93 The first positive LGBT rights in the UK came with the Adoption and Children Act 2002, giving adoption rights 
to same-sex couples, and the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003. Legislation prior to 
this took the form of criminalisation and decriminalisation.  
94 ‘The five Convention grounds, that is, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group and 
political opinion, are not mutually exclusive and may overlap’ (UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection 
No. 9. Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’, UNHCR, 
2012, 11; Arnold (n 4) 113-114. 
95 Arnold (n 4) 118. 
96 UNHCR (n 2) 12. 
identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and that 
group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as being 
different by the surrounding society.97  
 
Despite concerns by the international legal community, this definition was entrenched in 
the X, Y and Z judgment in 2013.98 The implication of this is that claimants need to show 
both that they are members of a sexual minority (fundamental characteristic test) and also 
that they are or would be visible as such in their country of origin (social perception test). A 
literal application of article 10(1)(d) legitimates refusals of claims on the basis that, while 
the applicant is believed to belong to a sexual minority, they are not perceived, and would 
not be perceived, as such, and therefore could safely relocate to a different part of the 
country of origin. 
 
The International Commission of Jurists believes this is not a hypothetical concern: 
 
The application of the cumulative two-limb test to establish the existence of a PSG 
[particular social group] has given rise to a further disturbing development in the 
context of SOGI [Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity] -based asylum claims. 
Namely, some refugee-status decisionmakers have found that, while certain 
applicants’ claims satisfied the protected characteristics limb, they did not meet the 
social perception limb, either because the group of LGBTI persons are not visible 
                                                          
97 Directive 2004/83/EC (Qualification Directive), Article 10 (1)(d)) (emphasis added). 
98 ‘The Court frames its answer to the question as to “whether foreign nationals with a homosexual orientation 
form a particular social group” with reference to the 2004 [Qualification Directive’s] cumulative, two-limbed 
test: do the members of the group share an innate characteristic, or a characteristic or belief that is so 
fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce? And (instead of or), 
does the group have a distinct identity in the relevant country, because it is perceived as different by the 
surrounding society? In ruling on this question, the CJEU adopted the cumulative application of the “protected 
characteristics” and the “social perception’” approaches to the definition of membership of a particular social 
group, despite the fact that the UNHCR’s authoritative interpretation of the Refugee Convention does not 
support such a reading.’ (International Commission of Jurists, ‘X, Y and Z: a glass half full for “rainbow 
refugees”? The International Commission of Jurists’ observations on the judgment of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in X, Y and Z v. Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel’ (3 June 2014) 11 (footnotes omitted). 
within a given society or because the individuals themselves are not ‘out’ enough to 
be perceived as part of that group by society.99 
 
Unfortunately, Home Office guidance follows the EU rather than the UNHCR definition.100 
However, in 2006, the House of Lords gave the view that Article 10 of the Qualification 
Directive ‘propounds a test more stringent than is warranted by international authority’.101 
How this has played out in the UK is unclear and merits further research, but at the very 
least it creates the potential for confusion on the part of UK decision makers that is not 
resolved by the official guidance on sexual orientation-based claims.102 And if claimants 
must demonstrate that they both have an immutable characteristic and are also seen as 
different, it is unsurprising that one leading practitioner said he encourages clients 
presenting to a judge ‘to bring friends from the gay community and referred to it as a “pink 
parade”.’103 
 
The requirement to prove that one belongs to a sexual minority and that one is visible as 
such is at odds with the theoretically low burden of proof for all asylum claims.104 
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Recognising what is at stake in claims for protection, Home Office guidance on assessing 
credibility in all asylum claims makes this very clear:  
 
The level of proof needed to establish the material facts is a relatively low one – a 
reasonable degree of likelihood – and must be borne in mind throughout the 
process. It is low because of what is potentially at stake – the individual’s life or 
liberty – and because asylum seekers are unlikely to be able to compile and carry 
dossiers of evidence out of the country of persecution.  
and 
‘Reasonable degree of likelihood’ is a long way below the criminal standard of 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’, and it is less than the civil standard of ‘the balance of 
probabilities’ (i.e. ‘more likely than not’). Other terms may be used: ‘a reasonable 
likelihood’ or, ‘a real possibility’, or ‘real risk’; they all mean the same.105  
 
Home Office guidance tells caseworkers they ‘must not stereotype the behaviour or 
characteristics of lesbian, gay or bisexual persons’.106 But if one accepts that sexual and 
gender identity are not simply the sum of activities and preferences – clubbing, musical 
tastes and what kinds of sex one has – then how does one provide evidence to meet either 
arm of the test? Explicit details of sexual activity, whether verbal accounts or in the form of 
videos and photos have rightly been ruled out by European Union law,107 and Home Office 
guidance now goes so far as to provide a script for caseworkers in situations where they are 
presented with sexually explicit material, a script beginning ‘Stop please. I am not going to 
ask you any detailed questions about sex.’108 
 
A sensitive alternative approach to establishing credibility is the DSSH model developed by S 
Chelvan, based on exploring applicants’ experiences of difference, stigma, shame and 
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harm.109 An individual narrative of persecution grouped around these four themes would be 
likely to shed light on the individual’s identity and how the surrounding community 
perceives this without a rigid requirement for these elements. While the DSSH model has 
been criticised by some for reinforcing rigid or linear notions of non-heterosexual identity, 
others recognise it as a welcome improvement on models which focus on sexual behaviour 
and activity.110 While this model is not explicitly mentioned in Home Office guidance, its 
four elements are all highlighted throughout the main guidance on sexual orientation and 
gender identity-based claims.111 
 
However, it is difficult to reconcile the Home Office guidance with the high level of first-
decision refusals of asylum claims set against reversals of refusals: between July 2015 and 
March 2017, approximately one-third of appeals involving sexual orientation were 
allowed.112 This shows that erroneous initial decisions were made in a significant proportion 
of cases, suggesting a discrepancy between the Home Office guidance on assessing 
credibility and its application by caseworkers, as well as the discrepancy identified above 
between the instructions of the UK Government, EU law and case law, and the UNHCR 
about the definition of a particular social group for LGBTQI asylum seekers. It is not 
surprising if the application and appeals process is therefore somewhat of a lottery for 
individuals. 
 
4. Flaws in the asylum process 
This article has identified inconsistencies between the UNHCR, EU and domestic materials 
that together provide UK decision makers in both the Home Office and the courts with the 
necessary guidance for assessing LGBTQI asylum applications. In conclusion, it will examine 
the impact this has by looking at a specific case, that of AR.113 In fairness, this is an unusual 
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case in the number of appeals that the claimant has had to go through – six decisions over 
four years with successive orders that the judges in each hearing should not be involved in 
subsequent stages. One of the judges involved said ‘[w]e can only hope that the long and 
unfortunate history recounted above is not typical of immigration proceedings in the 
tribunal system’.114 However, delays are not uncommon according to the NGO Asylum Aid: 
 
We regularly receive letters six months after interview stating that a claim is complex 
in nature and as such falls outside the normal service standards. Since 2016, our 
experience has been that fewer cases are decided within 6 months, and cases not 
decided within the 6-month standard regularly wait over a year or more for a 
decision. Our lawyers describe this part of the process as a ‘black hole’.115 
 
AR’s story involved the sale of a kidney and accusations of sodomy, as well as the usual 
disputed evidence about how often the gay asylum applicant had attended gay clubs. The 
case demonstrates many of the problems identified in this article.  
 
In 2013, the appellant, a gay man from Pakistan seeking asylum in the UK, appealed against 
the decision to remove him to Pakistan. The judge in the First-tier Tribunal, Judge Quigley, 
initially allowed his appeal, accepting that he was homosexual based on the evidence, which 
included an official police First Information Report (FIR) of his detention following an 
allegation of sodomy and a Pakistani newspaper article reporting this. Here, AR met both 
arms of the particular social group test in proving that he was both gay and visibly gay in his 
country of origin. Country of origin information provided evidence of the Pakistani 
authorities’ failure to protect gay men. Moreover, internal relocation would not be an 
option as it would depend on AR concealing his sexual identity through fear of persecution. 
 
One statement by Judge Quigley brings together the three issues highlighted in this article – 
at this stage, to the benefit of the applicant: 
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I find that this appellant has been the subject of adverse attention in the past by 
reason of his sexual orientation [fundamental characteristic and social perception]. I 
find that were he to be removed to Pakistan, he would resort to concealment of 
sexual orientation as a result of a genuine fear that otherwise he will be persecuted 
[‘discretion’ test]. Accordingly, on the basis of the objective information considered 
above, that fear is well-founded [country of origin information submitted]. 
Accordingly, I find that this appellant is entitled to a grant of asylum.116 [author’s 
additions] 
 
If the case had ended there, one might argue that guidance and case law were being applied 
effectively to facilitate fair decision making, but it did not: the Secretary of State successfully 
appealed, the matter was remitted from the Upper Tribunal back to the First-tier Tribunal 
(with the order that Judge Quigley not be involved). The appeal was refused and there were 
further decisions and reversals until the decision of the Upper Tribunal to remit the case to 
the First-Tier Tribunal once more in January 2016.117 
 
In these subsequent decisions and the discussions that informed them, some of the 
difficulties in establishing sexual identity and verifying reports from the country of origin are 
apparent. The appellant did not claim asylum on the basis of sexual orientation when he 
first arrived in the UK, and the unfavourable decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge in 
October 2013 was based on the belief that the appellant was asserting that he was gay only 
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to support his asylum claim.118 In the First-tier Tribunal, Judge Farrelly also found the 
account of selling a kidney to come to the UK lacking in credibility, while adding ‘[t]here is 
no doubt he only has one kidney’.119 
 
However, the most striking aspect of the case is what happens when the tests for 
‘discretion’ and for proving membership of a particular social group converge. Here it results 
in this combination of statements: on the one hand, Judge Farrelly ‘did not believe the 
appellant was homosexual’, but, at the same time: 
 
If he was a homosexual, and with regard to the second stage of the test set out by 
Lord Hope in HJ (Iran) at paragraph 35, the judge accepted that Pakistan is intolerant 
of homosexuality and that the state would not provide protection. The view was 
taken that, if returned to Pakistan, he would not behave in a manner likely to bring 
adverse attention upon himself. He would “conduct himself consistent with his 
upbringing, nature and the social mores in place” (paragraph 40). This was supported 
by the low level of homosexual activity reported in the UK. The judge saw no real risk 
of persecution in Pakistan. The appeal against the removal directions was refused.120 
 
In other words: ‘We don’t believe you’re gay, but if you were, it would be safe to return 
you’.  
 
At the time of writing, the most recent tribunal decision in this case had been quashed and 
the case remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for appeal against removal, ‘and this by a judge 
who has had no previous involvement in the case’.121 
 
The UK government’s own figures suggest that the areas of inconsistency identified here 
detrimentally affect individuals, judging by the high and varying refusal rates for applicants 
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from countries that criminalise same-sex activity,122 and also by the high level of initial 
decisions that are overturned on appeal. A superficial sweep of key LGBTQI asylum cases 
and media stories from 2010 to 2016 finds worryingly little change over more than half a 
decade: sexual minority asylum seekers from the same countries – Nigeria, Uganda, Iran and 
Cameroon are prominent – are having their claims refused because decision makers at both 
Home Office and appeal stages find their narrative implausible, with the high proportion of 
first decision refusals winnowed down somewhat on appeal. There are still reports of last 
minute reprieves from deportation on a charter flight, apparently as a result only of online 
petitions, grass-roots campaigning and investigative reporting.123 This is suggestive of flaws 
throughout the process.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This article has highlighted three critical points of inconsistency and unfairness in the UK 
relating to the ‘discretion’ requirement, country of origin information, and the fundamental 
problem of proving one’s sexual identity in the context of contradictory guidance by 
international bodies and domestic authorities. Together they are the explanation for many 
failed applications by LGBTQI asylum seekers where the view of the Secretary of State or the 
judge is either that the individual is not genuinely LGBTQI; or that they may be, but it would 
be safe for them to relocate to a different part of the country of persecution; or that it 
would be safe to return them because they would choose to live ‘discreetly’.  
 
Setting aside problems with the quality of individual casework and political and media 
hostility to asylum seekers at a national level, and even if one assumes that at the level of 
Home Office policy there is the intention to create a system that is at least consistent on a 
case-by-case basis, the unfair treatment of LGBTQI asylum seekers is unlikely to be 
eliminated while the problems identified here remain unaddressed.  
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To end on a constructive note, how might LGBTQI asylum decision making be improved? 
There is an inherent tension between refugee law and decision making – both of which are 
about establishing facts and definitive accounts – and sexual and gender identities, which 
are increasingly understood as fluid both over time and at any one moment.124 If the two 
arms of the particular social group test are retained, one way would be to adjust the 
balance between them. At present, the emphasis is on the individual’s sexual identity, 
which, as suggested above, is very difficult to verify without resorting to debates about how 
regularly one has to frequent a gay club to qualify as homosexual, or whether someone is 
bisexual or ‘just experimenting’.125 The more important question concerns perception in the 
context of accurate and up-to-date information about country of origin conditions. Using 
this approach, instead of the question: ‘Are you a lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender? If 
so, prove it’, decision makers would first ask ‘Are you from a country where LGBTQI people 
are persecuted?’ and secondly, ‘Would you be viewed as LGBTQI if you went back there?’ 
While this proposal clearly needs further exploration and would not resolve all the existing 
complexities and contradictions in the asylum process as it applies to sexual minorities, it 
provides a starting point that is more likely to lead to consistent decisions and a fair 
outcome for individuals than is currently the case. 
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